Rare broadside plan of the Battle of Bunker Hill issued during the first year of the American Revolution, with a revealing letterpress account by General John Burgoyne. 

“A Plan of the Battle, on Bunkers Hill”
The large and attractive plan depicts the entire Charlestown peninsula, Boston proper, and parts of Cambridge and Somerville. The American redoubt on Breed’s Hill—here mislabeled “Bunkers Hill”–and the famous “rail fence” extending downhill to the Mystic River are detailed, along with the British landing points, direction of advance, and vessels at the mouth of the Charles River providing artillery support. The plan shows well the difficulty the Americans faced in moving reinforcements to the battle, as relieving troops had to cross Charlestown Neck and traverse hundreds of yards of highly-exposed terrain. What the plan does not reveal is that prior to the successful storming of the American redoubt, the first two British advances were thrown back with terrible losses.

Another interesting element of the plan is the small note just west of Charlestown Neck reading “Hither the Ships ought to have come.” This reflects General George Clinton’s recommendation for a landing at Charlestown Neck, which would have flanked and trapped the American troops on the peninsula. An over-confident General Howe overruled Clinton, opting instead for a frontal assault.

Below the map is a June 25 letter from General Burgoyne, who witnessed the battle from the safety of Copp’s Hill in Boston. The provides an important and vivid account of the battle, though “Burgoyne, always with a flair for dramatics, describes the action at Bunker Hill as if he were observing a grand tournament.” (Nebenzahl, Atlas, p. 43) The letter provides insight into the thinking of British officers prior to the battle, stating that it was “absolutely necessary we should make ourselves masters of these heights [around Boston] and we proposed to begin with Dorchester” on June 18, a plan which was of course upended by the American occupation of Breed’s Hill on the night of June 16-17. In the end the British failure ever to fortify Dorchester Heights provided the opening for George Washington and the Continental Army to do so in March 1776, compelling the British to evacuate the town.

Later in the letter Burgoyne relates that Howe, whose force was being “hurt by musquetry from Charles-Town”, “desired us to set fire to the town, which was immediately done,” reducing it to “rubbish.” It is clear from Burgoyne’s letter that he had gained at least some measure of respect for the Americans: the battle was “a picture and a complication of horror and importance beyond anything that ever came my lot to be witness to”, and “a fight for a young soldier that the longest service may not furnish again.”

To my mind the combination of the informative plan and Burgoyne’s vivid letter render this one of the most desirable contemporary plans of the battle.

Background
After the April 19^th battles at Lexington and Concord, American militia formed a ring of encampments and fortifications surrounding Boston. The British were hemmed in, but the Americans lacked the training or equipment to attack the town head-on, particularly as the British retained unimpeded command of the sea.

But on the night of June 16^th the Americans attempted a game changer. A force of some 1200 led by General Israel Putnam and Colonel William Prescott occupied the Charlestown peninsula and built a redout atop Breed’s Hill (Bunker Hill, which gave the battle its name, in fact lay north and west of Breed’s and was only lightly fortified). If the Americans were permitted to emplace artillery there—and could find sufficient gunpowder–they would gain command of the Charles River and been able to bombard Boston itself.

On the morning of the 17^th the British in Boston awoke to this nightmare scenario. Commander-in-Chief Thomas Gage ordered several regiments to cross the Charles and assault the hill, with artillery support from naval vessels moored in the river. The attack was led by General William Howe—who in October of 1775 would succeed Gage as Commander in Chief in North America.  It consisted of more or less simultaneous direct assault on the redoubt and a move on the Americans’ left flank, aimed directly at a force of Connecticut militia positioned behind a rail fence.

The British expected a walkover: They had something like 3000 well-armed regular troops supported by heavily-armed vessels in the river, facing just over 2000 poorly-supplied and largely-untested American militia.  The assumption was that most Americans would turn and run when they saw the Regulars marching toward them, bayonets mounted.

But the Americans didn’t run, and the battle was a nightmare for the British: Their first two assaults were thrown back, though on the third they captured the redoubt and force the surviving Americans to retreat across Charlestown Neck. By the time the battle had ended the British had suffered over 1000 casualties; indeed, it is said that one eighth of all British officers killed during the Revolution died in the battle.  Indeed, the British General Henry Clinton—another future Commander in Chief—wrote in his diary that “A few more such victories would have shortly put an end to British dominion in America.”

References
Boston Engineering Department, List of Maps of Boston, p. 64. Nebenzahl, Atlas of the American Revolution, #3 and p. 43. Nebenzahl, Bibliography of Printed Battle Plans of the American Revolution, #28. Phillips, List of Maps of America, p. 180.